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1 One function of elections is to enable voters to provide their collective judgement of the
incumbent government. In making this judgement, it seems reasonable to assume that
the government’s policy record – its successes and moreover its failures – will play a role.
However, whether or not voters reward or penalise parties for delivering or failing to
deliver on their policy promises is likely to depend on at least two factors. Firstly, all
things being equal, a policy success or failure is more likely to matter when the policy in
question is publicly visible and widely known. If a party is able to obscure its poor record
on a particular issue – for example by highlighting other issues – or if its record has not
been widely debated and scrutinised through the mass media, then it is more likely to
escape electoral punishment. Secondly, and related to the previous point, policy success
or failure is more likely to matter if it relates to an issue that voters care about. In other
words,  a government’s record will  matter more on issues that are highly salient and
about which voters express clear and strong preferences.
2 These conditions were all met regarding the Coalition government’s immigration policy
record in the run-up to the 2015 UK general election. In 2010, the Conservatives had
committed to reduce net migration from hundreds of thousands to tens of thousands – “
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no ifs, no buts” as David Cameron put it. Over the five years of the Con-Dem Coalition, they
failed, and failed spectacularly, to do so. Not only did they not meet their own target, they
actually presided over an increase in net migration, to a figure significantly higher than
Labour’s final years in office. In the latter years of the Coalition this failure was widely
observed in the media and, as we will see, at least one political party made it central to its
attack  on  the  Conservatives.  Yet  rather  than  hide  the  issue,  the  Conservatives
recommitted themselves to the net migration target in their 2015 manifesto. This was all
the more surprising because by 2015 voters considered immigration to be the second
most important issue facing the country (after the economy) and the majority of them
thought that immigration was too high. Given all of this, it might have been expected that
voters would punish the Conservatives at the ballot box.
3 In the event,  the Conservatives’  record on immigration did not appear to harm their
election result. In one of the biggest upsets in British electoral history, the Conservatives
outperformed every pollster’s predictions – for reasons that are still unclear – and win an
outright majority. Pollsters were so confounded that the British Polling Council launched
an inquiry (on-going at the time of writing) into how they got it so wrong. A complete
explanation of  why the Conservatives  did so well  and Labour so badly  is,  of  course,
complex and multi-faceted and would require attention to a number of factors: the SNP’s
surge  leading  to  Labour’s  collapse  in  Scotland;  the  Conservatives  benefiting
disproportionately from the Lib Dems’ collapse throughout the UK; Ed Miliband’s poor
approval ratings; and the Conservative’s effective (though false) economic narrative that
blamed the deficit on Labour’s supposed profligacy before the 2008 financial crisis (see for
example Bale and Shaw’s contributions to this volume). So it could be that immigration
was simply outweighed by these other factors. In other words, the Conservatives did well
despite failing to meet their own migration target, the counterfactual being that they
would have done even better had they met the target.
4 While intuitively plausible, I think this is incorrect. In this paper I want to argue that in
fact the Conservatives won a majority not despite their immigration policy failure, but in
large part because of it. In other words, their failure to reduce immigration and address
public anxiety about this issue should be added to the list of reasons why they won,
rather than considered as a factor that they overcame to win. How so?
 
Promises, promises
5 We have to go back to the previous election in 2010 to understand how the Conservatives
set themselves up to fail, yet succeed. Then as now, the Conservatives enjoyed a lead over
Labour on immigration. Voters had lost trust in Labour’s ability to manage migration and
since the 2004 EU enlargement resulted in large increases in immigration to the UK
attitudes had hardened. As the 2010 election drew near, the Conservatives were keen to
exploit their advantage on this issue. At the same time, they faced a threat from the right,
in the form of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which since 2005 had
increasingly campaigned on an anti-immigration message. Thus both in its competition
with Labour over the centre ground, and in its efforts to prevent defectors to UKIP on the
right, a robust policy on immigration seemed essential to any Conservative victory. 
6 The challenge was to articulate such a policy without falling into the trap of appearing as
the “nasty party”, as arguably the Conservatives had done in the 2005 election, when the
party used none too subtle dog-whistle posters on immigration asking “are you thinking
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what we’re thinking?” and moreover promised in their manifesto to withdraw Britain from
the United Nations Refugee Convention. In the party’s 2005 election post-mortem, this
draconian approach immigration was identified as having discouraged some swing voters
from voting Tory and thus contributing to defeat. The new Conservative leader, David
Cameron, had committed to modernise the party, precisely aiming to shed the “nasty”
image and make it more appealing to centrists. So Cameron needed an immigration policy
that  was  tough  enough  to  exploit  the  party’s  advantage  over  Labour  and  prevent
defections to UKIP, yet not so tough as to jeopardise his modernisation strategy.
7 The  solution  was  the  net  migration  target.  Cameron first  announced in  a  television
interview that if elected his party would reduce net migration “from hundreds to tens of
thousands” in the course of the next Parliament, a promise that was then included in the
Conservative  Party  manifesto.  At  the  time,  net  migration  was  255,000  per  year,  so
Cameron had effectively committed to more than halving it in the space of just five years.
The  target  sounded  robust  –  it  after  all  committed  the  party  to  very  substantially
reducing migration to Britain – yet it did not demonise immigrants and had a pleasing
technocratic ring to it  (even if  in reality it  was endorsed by hardly any experts).  Of
course, in the 2010 election the Conservatives did not win a majority, but they were the
largest  party  and  entered  into  negotiations  with  the  Liberal  Democrats  over  the
formation of  a  coalition government.  In  the  Coalition  Agreement,  the  net  migration
target was not included as the Lib Dems would not endorse it, but it nevertheless became
de facto government policy, clearly driving a restrictive policy agenda on students and
family migration, and to a lesser extent work migration.
8 Although it made sense politically, the migration target was at best a hostage to fortune.
Net  migration  is  simply  immigration  minus  emigration.  Democratic  states  cannot
effectively control emigration: neither by forcing people to leave nor preventing them
from doing so. Short of becoming an authoritarian state the emigration half of the net
migration equation is thus outside government’s control. The immigration side of the
equation is in principle more controllable, but there are important limitations here too,
not least since a significant proportion of immigration to the UK comes from other EU
countries. So long as it remains part of the EU, the government has no effective control
over this inflow which is guaranteed by European free movement rights. Immigration
from  outside  the  EU  is  more  controllable,  but  (as  discussed  below)  there  are  real
constraints on government even here.
9 For these reasons, many commentators and academics (including this author) said at the
time that the target was effectively impossible to achieve. It was certainly difficult to see
how the Coalition could both secure an economic recovery (where relative economic
strength would attract immigrants, especially EU free movers) and reduce net migration
to  under  100,000.  Thus  two  of  the  Conservatives’  central  commitments  seemed
incompatible, if not flatly contradictory. The same commentators who pointed this out
also typically argued that the target would come to haunt the Conservatives. While it
might have paid electoral dividends in 2010, they claimed, the target would soon become
an electoral albatross, costing votes at the next election. In hindsight, while critics were
right to observe that the target would not be achieved, they were wrong to think that this
would be politically costly (as we shall see below).
10 Initially, it looked as though the government might get close to the target. Net migration
fell during the first two years of the Coalition, reaching a low of 153,000 in the year to
October 2012. From late 2012 onwards, however, net migration started to increase again.
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By  the  end  of  2014,  the  last  figures  released  before  the  election  in  May  2015,  net
migration was 318,000.1 This was not only three times the target and 63,000 higher than
when the Coalition was formed, but higher than at any time since 2005.
11 The failure  to  reduce  migration below the  level  when they  entered office,  let  alone
achieve their self-imposed target,  was certainly not for want of  trying.  The Coalition
government introduced a slew of restrictive policies across the spectrum of routes.2 Work
entry routes were closed or tightened, and an annual cap was put on the number of
skilled  workers  that  employers  could  recruit.  Businesses,  and  even  some  foreign
governments, complained loudly about these changes, and indeed managed to extract
some significant  concessions,  but  there  is  little  doubt  that  policy  on  non-EU labour
migrants tightened under the coalition. And this was notwithstanding a Liberal Democrat
Business Secretary,  Vince Cable,  who fought a running,  and often public,  battle over
immigration policy with Teresa May at the Home Office. The changes were more dramatic
in the areas of international students and family migration. The financial requirements
for sponsors of family migrants were increased, as were English language requirements
for foreign spouses. Financial and language requirements were also raised for overseas
students, and new restrictions were put on students’ rights to work or bring dependent
relatives.
12 These policies failed to reduce net migration for three main reasons.  First,  and most
important, was the substantial increase in the number of EU citizens migrating to Britain.
While free movement to the UK had dropped off in the immediate aftermath of the 2008
financial crisis, especially from Central and Eastern Europe, it picked up again as the UK
labour market, while hardly booming, was in better shape than many other EU countries.
In particular, the crippling effects of the Eurozone crisis on southern European countries
– where youth unemployment reaching staggering levels of up to 50 per cent – created a
new flow of young Europeans in search of work. Cafes and restaurants in London were
inundated with university-educated Spaniards, Portuguese, Greeks and Italians fleeing
their ravaged economies. Second, even non-EU immigration, which was affected by all the
policies above also increased. The reasons for this are complicated but again reflect the
relative (if not absolute) strength of the British economy, especially after the Chancellor
eased back on austerity  in  2012,  as  well  as  the  path dependent  nature  of  non-work
migration routes. Third, the effect of increased immigration flows was compounded by
the decrease in the number of people emigrating from Britain, as fewer people went to
work or retire abroad.
13 These  developments  meant  that  the  Conservatives  approached  the  2015  election
campaign having singularly failed to deliver on one of their headline promises. 
 
Getting away with it? Migration in the 2015 election
campaign
14 Given all of this it was perhaps surprising that the Conservatives chose to reaffirm their
commitment  to  the  net  migration  target  in  the  2015  campaign.  The  2015  manifesto
promised that they party would “keep our ambition of delivering annual net migration in the
tens of thousands,  not the hundreds of thousands”, and blamed the failure to do so – not
entirely inaccurately – on the economic recovery.3 Presumably, the Conservatives took
the decision that reneging on the commitment would do more damage than reasserting it
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as an ambition. As the campaign got under way it was unclear how this would play for the
Conservatives,  but  it  was  certainly  plausible  to  think  that  it  could  damage  them,
especially with UKIP in the ascendant.
15 Furthermore, immigration was by now a highly salient issue and something about which
the electorate had strongly negative attitudes. IPSOS-Mori polls – if such things can be
believed anymore – showed that immigration was considered by voters to be the second
most important issue facing the country (See Fig 1).
 
Figure 1: IPSOS-MORI Index on most important issues facing the country 1993-2015
16 And the public had strong preferences for more restrictions on immigration. The 2013
British Social Attitudes Survey suggested that three-quarters of the British population
wanted to see immigration reduced, and over half wanted it to be ‘reduced a lot’ (See Fig
2).
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Figure 2: Preferences for level of immigration to Britain, 2013
17 Despite this, immigration did not figure in the campaign as much as might have been
expected.  The Conservatives did not want to draw attention to the high level  of  net
migration while Labour had little to gain from politicising the issue. For both of the main
parties immigration was, as it had been for some time, electorally risky and internally
divisive. Immigration is generally an issue that splits both centre-left and centre-right
parties, with the former divided between cultural conservatives and free market, pro-
business interests,  while the latter finds itself caught between left cosmopolitans and
internationalists on the one hand, versus labour market and welfare protectionists on the
other.4 In the specific context of the 2015 British election, these divisions had a particular
resonance because were immigration to become a central aspect of the campaign, both
Conservatives and Labour would find themselves having to defend an unpopular record –
the Conservatives’ missed target and Labour’s record of policy liberalisation when it was
in government.
18 Thus while the Conservatives still enjoyed a lead over Labour on immigration they did
not  seek  to  make  the  issue  a  major  part  of  their  campaign.  The  Party’s  two  chief
strategists  –  the  Australian  electoral  strategist,  Lynton  Crosby,  and  the  Chancellor,
George Osborne – focused instead on the economic recovery (weak though it was) and
how Labour’s alleged fiscal profligacy meant they could not be trusted with the reins of
government. 
19 For its part, Labour did not seek to go on the offensive on the missed target because it was
itself increasingly split on immigration and acutely aware of how many of its core voters
thought the party had been too liberal when in office. Instead it staked out a largely
defensive position to present itself as tough on immigration without really attacking the
Coalition’s  record.  While parts  of  the party – including both some Blairites  and left-
wingers – thought Labour’s record in office should be defended, figures such as John
Cruddas,  who Ed  Miliband had  appointed  as  Policy  Coordinator  to  write  the  party’s
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manifesto, successfully argued that Labour needed to adopt a robust line on immigration.
Thus Miliband apologised for his party’s supposed mistakes in 2004-2010, admitting that
the previous Labour government had been too sanguine about the effects of immigration,
and he made tighter controls on immigration one of the party’s five election pledges. The
pledge for “controls on immigration” adorned a much-derided campaign mug, as well as the
even more derided “Ed Stone” –  the surreal  stone slab carved with Labour’s  election
pledges, which Miliband promised to put in the Downing Street garden if he was elected
Prime Minister.
20 There was an interesting parallel in all of this with the debate on the economy. On both
issues,  the  Conservatives  arguably  had a  poor  record (most  economists  arguing that
austerity was unnecessary and had in fact harmed the recovery) yet managed to present
themselves  as  competent  while  depicting  Labour  as  unreliable.  And  on  both  issues,
Labour failed effectively to challenge this narrative – allowing the idea that they were to
blame for the deficit and uncontrolled immigration to take hold.
 
A fox in the henhouse – the rise of UKIP
21 If Labour’s defensiveness on immigration is perhaps a necessary, it is not a sufficient
condition, to explain how the Conservative’s immigration policy failure contributed to
their  electoral  success.  The  missing  piece  of  the  puzzle  is  the  United  Kingdom
Independence Party (UKIP), which unlike the major parties did campaign, and campaign
vociferously, on immigration.
22 As its name implies, UKIP began life as a party with the principal aim of withdrawing the
UK from the European Union. Founded in 1991 as the Anti-Federalist League by Alan
Sked, a Professor of History at the LSE, it was renamed UKIP in 1993. For many years UKIP
was effectively a single-issue party,  which drew its  limited support  from Eurosceptic
Tories. It achieved some modest successes, but never looked likely to trouble the main
parties. After a particularly poor performance in the 2005 general election, UKIP elected
Nigel Farage, a sitting MEP, as its new leader. Farage set about trying to widen the party’s
appeal with a broader right-wing agenda in an effort to pick up support from Tories
alienated by (what they saw as) David Cameron’s socially liberal modernisation of the
Conservative Party. 
23 From August 2010,  when he was re-elected as leader following a brief  hiatus,  Farage
developed  a  two-pronged  strategy  for  UKIP:  first,  a  focus  on  developing  the  party’s
representation  in  selected  local  councils  to  create  bridgeheads  for  national  election
campaigns; and second, adaptation of the party’s core message to target disenfranchised
working-class voters. Election results revealed that UKIP was gaining support in areas
with  a  large  proportion  of  blue-collar  voters.  Conversely,  it  was  doing  badly  in
metropolitan  areas  with  higher  levels  of  education  and  significant  ethnic  minority
populations. In other words, UKIP’s support was evolving from a reliance on dyed-in-the-
wool  Europhobes  and  the  “disgruntled  of  Tunbridge  Wells”  to  a  more  economically
marginalised base. Under Farage, UKIP increasingly became a party of these “left behind”
voters: working class, mostly white, and with few educational qualifications.
24 The  central  issue  chosen  to  develop  this  strategy  to  target  the  “left  behind”  was
immigration. UKIP had been long arguing that European integration threatened British
national sovereignty, but this was a relatively esoteric pitch, unable to galvanise voters
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whose concerns were more immediate and visceral than monetary union or Brussels “red
tape”. Fortunately for UKIP, the EU and immigration had already begun to fuse as issues
in the public mind following the 2004 enlargement round, when thousands of central and
eastern  Europeans  exercised  their  new rights  as  EU citizens  to  move  to  the UK.  As
immigration from Poland and other A8 countries soared, significant parts of the public,
especially  those  competing  for  jobs  with  the  newcomers,  began  to  express  growing
concern about immigration. This created an opportunity for UKIP to fuse its longstanding
opposition towards the EU with an altogether more electorally potent issue. It was an
opportunity Farage did not pass up.  He set about refocusing UKIP’s core message on
immigration,  and  on  European immigration  in  particular.  The  only  way  the  UK can
effectively control immigration, he argued, is to withdraw from the EU.
25 Thus UKIP morphed from being a fringe Eurosceptic party into a populist far right party,
with immigration – especially though not exclusively from the EU – at the forefront of its
campaigns.  Its  focus  on  EU  free  movement  –  rather  than  Muslim  or  other  non-EU
immigrants – distinguishes UKIP from some other populist far right parties in Europe, but
in many ways it increasingly resembles them. As with other members of this party family
it is nationalist, economically conservative (though it has shifted from a libertarian to
more protectionist stance in recent years) and populist. In Farage it has a charismatic
leader who, literally as well as metaphorically, likes to present himself as a “bloke down
the pub”, in contrast to the cosmopolitan elite of the mainstream parties. 
26 This change has certainly widened the electoral appeal of UKIP, in terms of both the
socio-demography and geography of its voters. Without losing its earlier support from
Europhobic ex-Tories  in southern England,  UKIP has attracted growing support  from
white working-class voters across the country,  including the Midlands and the North
(their support remains more limited in Wales and especially in Scotland). Indeed, the
stereotypical UKIP voter of the 1990s – a Blimpish ex-Tory living in southern England – is
less  and less  important as  an altogether different group has turned to the party.  As
Robert  Ford  and  Matthew  Goodwin  pointed  out  in  2014,  UKIP’s  support  has  an
increasingly clear social profile: “old, male, working class, white and less educated”.5 These are
“disadvantaged and economically insecure Britons, who are profoundly uncomfortable in the ‘new’
society, which they regard as alien and threatening.”6 As with many other far right parties in
Western Europe, UKIP’s support is nowadays founded on what Hans-Peter Kriesi calls the
“losers of globalization”,7 the growing number of people for whom the economic, social and
cultural changes of globalization are associated with insecurity and disadvantage, rather
than growth and prosperity, and who feel alienated by mainstream parties who, they
believe, represent the interests of cosmopolitan elites. 
27 An important implication of this, as Ford and Goodwin have been arguing for some time,
is that UKIP now pose as much a threat to Labour as to the Conservatives. Where UKIP
had once simply hived off voters from the right of the Conservative Party, it now stood to
harm the Labour party by eating into its  traditional  working-class  heartlands.  While
there  was  some  limited  evidence  of  this  occurring  already  in  the  2010  election  it
remained a matter of debate which party stood to lose more as a result of a UKIP surge in
the run-up to the 2015 election. 
28 UKIP did well in the 2013 local elections, winning 22 per cent of the popular vote and 147
seats, and especially in the 2014 European Parliamentary elections, where it emerged as
the largest single party with 26.6 per cent of the popular vote and 24 out of the UK’s 73
Parliamentary seats.  In both of  these polls,  especially  the European elections,  UKIP’s
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campaign concentrated  on immigration.  Most  of  its  election  posters  were  about  the
supposed harm that free movement caused British workers, and in his media appearances
Farage  focused  relentlessly  on  immigration.  In  one  of  his  more  controversial
interventions he claimed that “any normal and fair-minded person would have a perfect right
to be concerned if a group of Romanian people suddenly moved in next door”.8
29 It remained to be seen whether the successes in the local and European elections could be
repeated in the general election, and what effect this would have on the overall outcome.
Could UKIP retain the support it had acquired in these second-order elections, where
turn-out is lower and voters often protest against the main parties, and which moreover
are governed by more proportional electoral systems, unlike the Fast Past the Post system
of single member constituencies, which is notoriously difficult for smaller parties?
30 UKIP’s core message in the general election campaign was essentially the same as in the
EP elections. Although Farage himself fought what many thought a lacklustre campaign,
he still managed to generate media controversy by using the televised leaders debate to
attack migrants for health tourism, and on another occasion blaming his late arrival at a
meeting on traffic congestion caused by “open door immigration.” Unlike Labour, UKIP
did make the Conservative’s failure to meet its net migration target an issue. Indeed, one
of its general election campaign posters was a (quite clever) variation on a theme of a one
of  its  2014  European  election  posters.  While  the  2014  version  depicted  an  escalator
running up the white cliffs of Dover with the caption “No border. No control”, the 2015
poster used the same imagery but with three escalators to represent the idea that “
Immigration is three times higher than the Tories promised” (see Fig. 3).
 
Figure 3a: Spot the difference: UKIP 2014 European Election Posters
 
The Cost of Broken Promises or How Policy Failure Can Help Win Elections - Im...
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XX-3 | 2015
9
Figure 3b UKIP 2015 General Election Posters
31 In the event, UKIP did both spectacularly well and spectacularly badly. The bad news was
that  UKIP  returned  just  one  MP:  Douglas  Carswell,  a  former  Conservative  who  had
defected to UKIP in 2014. This was in stark contrast to some predictions that they could
win  in  several  tight  contests.  Perhaps  most  disappointing  was  the  result  for  Farage
himself. Despite concentrating his efforts on the constituency of South Thanet, he failed
to win, prompting his immediate (albeit short-lived) resignation.
32 But in terms of its popular support the UKIP surge held up pretty well. Across the UK the
party received 12.6 per cent of the vote, and in England, 14 per cent. Their total vote
share – nearly four million votes – was as large as the SNP and the Lib Dems combined
(who between them managed to win 64 seats). Moreover, UKIP came second in more than
120 seats. In terms of the influence of UKIP’s rise on the outcome of the election, it was
here that the effect was felt.
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Explaining successful failure
33 Indeed, in 2015 the chief significance of UKIP’s large popular vote spread across many
constituencies lies in the effect that it  had on the two main parties’  performance. In
short, while both the Conservatives and Labour lost votes to UKIP, the electoral damage
was greater for Labour. In numerous key marginals, especially in the Midlands and the
North of England, UKIP prevented Labour from taking seats they simply had to win from
the Tories.
34 Before demonstrating this, it is worth pausing to observe how counter-intuitive it is, at
least if one assumes (not unreasonably) that an incumbent party’s policy record on high
salience  issues  might  be  expected  to  affect  its  electoral  fortunes.  Given  that  UKIP
campaigned on immigration and indeed sought to make the Conservative’s migration
policy failure an electoral  issue,  it  might have been expected that  the Tories,  as  the
governing party (strictly speaking, the main party in a coalition) that had presided over
an increase in immigration, would be damaged most. However, while there were voters
who abandoned the Tories for UKIP over immigration, the more significant effect appears
to have been Labour voters shifting to UKIP for the same reason. In other words, while it
was the Conservative-led coalition that presided over increasing net migration, it was
Labour that bore the brunt of public frustration on the issue. Thus Conservative policy
failure contributed towards political success. 
35 Of course immigration was not the only factor that caused voters to defect to UKIP: a
general disaffection with the mainstream parties and opposition towards the European
Union – to the extent that they can be separated from immigration – were also important.
But immigration was undoubtedly a major factor, especially among former Labour voters.
36 To see how UKIP’s rise contributed towards Conservative victory by harming Labour we
can compare the results of the Conservatives and Labour in constituencies where UKIP
performed very well versus constituencies where UKIP performed relatively badly. As
Steve Fisher has pointed out, where the UKIP vote was up over 14 per cent on their 2010
result, the Conservatives were down 0.9 per cent and Labour up 1.6 per cent (see Table 1).9
At first glance, then, it appears that UKIP harmed the Tories. However, to gauge the UKIP
effect on each party’s relative performance what really matters is the difference in each
party’s vote in these seats compared to those where UKIP was not doing so well. In those
constituencies where the UKIP vote was up by less than 7 per cent, the Conservative vote
was up by 1.5 per cent while the Labour vote was up by 6.9 per cent. Therefore, Labour
(which remember increased its total UK vote share by 1.5 per cent compared to 2010) was
up 5.3 per cent less where UKIP did well, whereas the corresponding difference for the
Conservatives was 2.4 per cent. Thus in terms of the popular vote, UKIP hurt Labour more
than they hurt the Conservatives.
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Table 1: Change in the popular vote of the main parties where UKIP did well versus less well, 2015
 Constituencies where UKIP up <7% Constituencies where UKIP up >14% Difference UKIP doing less well minus d
Conservatives +1.5% -0.9% 2.4%
Labour +6.9% +1.6% 5.3%
Source: Author’s recalculations based on Fisher 2015.
37 This effect is even clearer at the level of constituency results, where UKIP stopped Labour
taking seats from the Tories. In constituencies where UKIP did less well (up <7%), Labour
managed to take 6 seats from the Tories. In contrast, where UKIP was polling strongly (up
>14%) Labour did not take a single seat from the Tories. Especially given the collapse of
the Labour Party in Scotland (where of  course it  faced the even more dramatic SNP
surge),  it  was these Tory-held English marginals that Labour had to win to have any
chance of forming a government; and it was here that Labour defectors to UKIP helped
the Conservatives.
38 There was a strong regional aspect to this effect. One post-election study by the polling
firm Survation found that while UKIP took more votes from the Conservatives than from
Labour in some parts of the country, in the North of England and possibly also in the
Midlands  UKIP  took  10-15  per  cent  more  of  its  vote  from  Labour  than  from  the
Conservatives.10 According to their poll of people who voted Labour in 2010, in the North
of England, where Labour lost 16 per cent of its 2010 voters, and in the Midlands, where it
lost 11 per cent, the largest share of lost votes went to UKIP. In the South of England,
Labour lost an even higher proportion of its 2010 vote, but here voters broke roughly
equally to the Conservatives (38 per cent) and UKIP (36 per cent). Only in London and
Scotland did UKIP not take votes from Labour.
39 In the North and the Midlands, the defection of Labour voters to UKIP stopped Labour
from taking key marginal seats that it needed to win from the Tories, and also resulted in
them losing supposedly safe seats to the Tories. In Conservative-held constituencies such
as Bury North and Weaver Vale (both Conservative-Labour marginals), the Tories held
with majorities significantly smaller than the number of Labour votes lost to UKIP. And in
places such as Bolton West and Morley and Outwood, seats that Labour expected to hold
(the latter being the constituency of Ed Balls, the Shadow Chancellor), Labour votes lost
to UKIP were instrumental to the Conservatives’ gains. Academics are not generally given
to  citing  UKIP  politicians  approvingly,  but  on  this  occasion  the  UKIP  candidate  for
Warwickshire North, William Cash, the son of Tory Eurosceptic Bill Cash MP, was quite
right when he argued that “the reason the Tories have won the key battleground of the Midlands
is that UKIP came to their rescue. We rode into the flanks of the white working class and captured
them [from Labour]. I had Tory workers coming up and hugging me”.11
 
Conclusion
40 It  is  widely  known among political  scientists  who study  migration that  immigration
policy is replete with unintended consequences. Yet rarely can the political consequences
of a migration policy have been quite so perverse as the case discussed here. Over the
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course of five years, the Conservatives’ failure to achieve a high profile commitment, one
that was intended to help them win the 2010 election by capitalising on their lead over
Labour  and stemming defections  to  UKIP,  became an electoral  benefit  by  prompting
defections of former Labour voters to UKIP. Counterfactually, had the Tories achieved
their  net  migration  target,  which  would  have  meant  very  substantial  reductions  in
immigration, it seems likely that public opposition towards immigration and thus UKIP’s
appeal would have been diminished, and fewer Labour voters would have responded to
Farage’s populist anti-immigration message.
41 It is tempting to think that George Osborne and Lynton Crosby, the two chief architects of
the Conservatives’ victory, may have sensed this and were happy to let public anxiety
about immigration run high assuming that defections to UKIP were likely to harm Labour
more than their own party. If that was their political calculus then it was a canny one,
and it helps to explain why the net migration target was reiterated in the 2015 manifesto.
Whether or not this is true – and it  is only speculation – it  is  clear is that far from
harming the Conservatives, failure to reduce net migration, let alone meet the target,
helped them to victory. A promise made in 2010 had become a promise broken in 2015;
but the latter was even more politically advantageous.
42 The wider lesson here is that there is such thing as a politically successful policy failure.
Contrary to the logic outlined at the start of the paper, this case shows that under certain
circumstances an incumbent’s failure to achieve its policy goals, even on a highly salient
issue, can not only not matter, but may even contribute towards electoral success. It may
sometimes be to the advantage of an incumbent party to set themselves up to fail, or at
least be at ease with their apparent failure, if they can see a positive political externality.
Of course, all of this depends on the caveat ‘under certain conditions’, which in this case
involved an insurgent party increasingly campaigning on the issue where the incumbent
party had “failed”, but where voter concern was concentrated among core supporters of
the opposition party. This is, of course, a rather specific set of circumstances. And while it
is possible to be wise after the fact, the implications were far from certain in real-time, as
they depended on how unpredictable party political dynamics and issue salience would
influence voter behaviour.
43 Whether the trick will work twice remains to be seen. Unless they renounce or quietly
resign the target mid-Parliament, neither of which seems likely, the Conservatives will go
into the 2020 election once again defending their record on net migration. Given that
there is no more reason to believe that the target will be achieved this time, the theory of
successful  failure may well  be put  to the test  once again.  Some of  the key variables
shaping how this unfolds will be whether immigration remains as salient an issue for
voters in 2020 as it is today, whether UKIP continues to build upon its populist anti-
immigration, anti-EU message, which in turn will depend on whether the UK is still in the
EU following Cameron’s in/out referendum, and whether Labour is able to wrest back
some of the votes it lost to UKIP. Given this, it would be unwise to assume that migration
policy failure will be so advantageous to the Conservatives again. 
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ABSTRACTS
Do policy  failures  inevitably  lead  to  electoral  punishment?  This  paper  examines  the  role  of
immigration  in  the  2015  UK  general  election  to  argue  that  policy  failure  can  be  electorally
successful.  In the 2010 election, the Conservatives had committed to reduce net migration to
under one hundred thousand. As majority partners in the 2010-15 Coalition government, they
failed spectacularly to achieve this, overseeing a substantial increase in net migration. By 2015
immigration was highly salient and the electorate wanted it reduced. The paper argues that the
Conservatives won a majority not despite their migration policy failure, but in large part because
of  it.  Their  failure  to  reduce  immigration  and  address  public  anxiety  contributed  to  the
emergence  of  UKIP  as  an  anti-immigration  party,  a  development  which  disproportionately
harmed Labour in the 2015 election. UKIP’s anti-immigration message helped the Conservative
win victories in a number of key marginal constituencies, thus contributing to their unexpected
majority.
Les politiques publiques qui manquent leurs objectifs mènent-elles inévitablement aux échecs
électoraux ? Cet article analyse le rôle de l’immigration dans les élections législatives de 2015
pour  montrer  que  les  objectifs  manqués  peuvent  contribuer  à  un  succès  électoral.  Lors  des
législatives  de  2010,  les  conservateurs  s’étaient  engagés  à  réduire  les  chiffres  nets  de
l’immigration à moins de 100 000. En tant que partenaires majoritaires dans le gouvernement de
coalition de 2010-2015, ils ont échoué de manière spectaculaire à atteindre cet objectif, et ont vu
au contraire une augmentation substantielle de l’immigration nette. Cet article montre que les
Conservateurs ont gagné la majorité en 2015 non pas malgré cet échec en matière migratoire,
mais en bonne partie à cause de lui. Leur incapacité à réduire l’immigration et de répondre aux
anxiétés  de  l’opinion  sur  le sujet  a  contribué  à  l’émergence  de  UKIP  comme  parti  anti-
immigration,  ce  qui  a  nui  de  manière  disproportionnée  aux  travaillistes.  Le  message  anti-
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immigration  de  UKIP  a  facilité  la  victoire  des  conservateurs  dans  un  ensemble  de
circonscriptions marginales cruciales, contribuant ainsi à leur majorité inattendue. 
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